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NCES VAN STIUK\, Appellant, v. ARCHIE H.
JO"NES, as Executor, etc., Hespondent.
[1] Wills-Disinheritance-Provisions of Will.-·Where m a will
tl'~tator's child i~ iuteutionally omitted or given $1.00 or
other sum, Prob. Code, § 90, relating to disinheritance, is
,nti~fied although the child is not mentioned by name.
-Disinheritance- Provisions of Will.-The use of such
[2]
a;; "relatives" and "children" in a will is sufficient
designate heirs who might otherwisP be pretermitted, but
generalities as "anyone who may contest this will" and
other person" do not include heirs otherwise pretermitted.
[3] !d.-Disinheritance-Provisions of WilL-Testator's daughter
a former marriage is not a pretermitted heir where the
in addition to providing generally for "any person" who
,,]nims under the will, also provides that if "any person who
I die intestate would be eutitled to share in my estate"
~hould contest the will he bequeaths to such pPrson the sum
$1.00.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San
Bernardino County. Archie D. Mitchell, Jnc1ge. Affirmed.
Actiou to establish a constructive trust. Judgment for
defeudant on sustaining demurrer to complaint without leave
to
affirmed.
Berniee l\L Coady and Joseph K. Coady for ..::\.ppellant.
Herbert C. Naylor for Hespondent.
SilENK, J.-This is an appeal from a judgment for the
defem1ant after a demurrer to the eomplaint had been sustained without leave to amend.
Robert Ludwig died testate on July 23, 1952. Surhim were the plaintiff, Frances Van Strien, a daugha former marriage, and the widow Mary E. Ludwig
vms appointed executrix of the will of her deceased hus'rhe entire estate was distributed to the widow m
[1] See Cal.Jur., Wills, § 238; Am.Jur., Wills, § 582.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Wills,§ 317; [2, 3] Wills,§ 318.
46 C.2d-23

[46 0.2d
decree of disaction was brought
that the
of the deceased and that the dewhich came into her
by
way
favor. Since
commencement of the action the defendant
E. Luddied and Archie R. Jones was
executor of her
wilL References to
defendant will be deemed to be to
E.
In her
the
alleges that the defendant's
IJC,~Hi.Vll for admission of the will to probate falsely stated
that the defendant was the only heir of the deceased; that
the defendant made such statement to prevent the plaintiff
from
of or participating in the probate proceedings;
that a similar false statement was made in the defendant's
petition for the decree of distribution and the decree which
followed was based thereon; that the plaintiff did not receive a notice of the probate proceedings, and that she did
not know of her father's death until over a year after the
decree of distribution was entered.
The main question involved on the appeal is whether the
plaintiff is a pretermitted heir under section 90 of the Probate Code. That section provides: "When a testator omits
to
in his will for any of his children, or for the
issue of any deceased child, whether born before or after
the making of the will or before or after the death of the
testator, and such child or issue are unprovided for by any
settlement, and have not had an equal proportion of the
testator's property bestowed on them by way of advancement, unless it appears from the will that such omission was
such child or such issue succeeds to the same
share in the estate of the testator as if he had died intestate."
If the plaintiff is a pretermitted heir it appears that her
complaint alleges sufficient facts to entitle her to relief from
the decree of distribution. (See Federal Farm Mtg. Corp.
v. Sandberg, 35 Cal.2d 1 [215 P.2d 721]; Gale v. Witt, 31
Cal.2d 362 [188 P.2d 755] ; 20 Cal.Jur.2d, Executors and
Administrators, p. 110.)
The defendant claims that the deceased
a clause contained in his will disinherited the plaintiff in terms sufficient to satisfy section 90. That clause provides: "If any
person who is, or claims under or through, a devisee, legatee,
or beneficiary under this Will, or any person who if I died
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the
in addition to
for ''<my person'' who claims under the
that if "any person who if l (lied intestate
itled to share in my estate" shonld eontesl the will
to snch person ihe sum of
.00. In e,-,trde
J{urt
190 CaL 146 :no P.
. the testator
: "I
nherit each and all persons ',yhatsoen~r
to
·who may br, my heirs at law .. and if allY of such
be,
or such
or any person whomsoeyer wl10, if I
wonld be cntN?cd to auy
my estale . . .
establish or assert any daim to my estatP .. I hereand
to said person or prrsom: the :sum of
·' The
of that will which
a1·p almost Hentical \\·ith the elam:c in
lun'
the
ease. ln FJ,frrfc
Dixnn, :?8 CaLApp.
[ 8~l P.2d 98 J, the will also "contained a elanw almost
·with the will of the decedent in" thP Knrtz ease.
!Se,,
Eslnle of Lindsa);, s~tpra, J7G CaL 2:\f\: Estate
l!rrs' fil. supra. 1G8 CaL 287; Estrrte
16 Cal.App.
2(1
[GO P.2d 1000].) In all of the
e:c1scs it was
hr],! that ehildren or
of the tcstnlor 1n•rr not
pr(•1 <'rmitted. IYhere the wills rrferred to them
as "heirs
not
mentioned," or "persons elaiming to be heirs."

--
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or as in the present case, "persons who if I died intestate
would be entitled to any part of my estate.'' Such provisions
in wills are guards against specific contests of the will, as
distinguished from provisions whereby the testator bequeaths
$1.00 or other sum to ''anyone who may contest this will.''
(Estate of Cochran, sttpra, 116 Cal.App.2d 98.) The wills
in the Kurtz and other cases herein cited to like effect make
definite and specific reference to persons who, by the laws of
succession, would be entitled to participate in the testator's
estate had he died intestate, or had he died testate but failed
to mention them in his will or otherwise provide for them.
Those cases support the conclusion of the trial court in sustaining the demurrer.
The judgment is affirmed.
Gibson, C.•T., Traynor, ,T., Spence, .J., and ::VIcComb, .J.,
concurred.
CARTEH, .J .-I dissent.
'fhe crucial clause in the will is nothing more than a ''no
contest'' provision and does not purport to show a provision
for or disinheritan(·e of deceased 'R daughter; it does not
Rhow that deceased testator had her in mind.
Before it may be said that section 90 of the Probate Code
has been satisfied it must appear from the will that the
testator had his child in mind, and intentionally omitted
her as a legatee from his will. 'fhis has bren stated repeatedly in many cases. Tt iR said in In re Salmon, 107 Cal.
614, 617 [40 P. 1030, 48 Am.St.Rep. 164]: "It is further
contended, howPver, that the fad that thr t('Rtator mrntions
the widows of his deceased sons, the mothers of the omitted
grandchildren, is sufficient, of itself, to show, without resort
to extrinsic facts, that the testator had his grandchildren in
his mind, and rebuts the presumption that they were forgotten. This position is equally untenable w·ith the first.
\Yhilc the anthorities of other states are far from being
uniform or harmonious upon the subject it is well settled
in this state that the mere fact that a testator mentions one
elosely related by blood or intimately associated in family
relations with the omittrd heir, does not show, as mattrr of
constrnetion, that the omitted one was in his 1nind and that
th mniission was intentionr1l. (Estate of Utz, 4:l Cal. 200;
Rush v. Lindsey, 44 CaL 121; In rr Str:vMts, supra 183 Cal.
:)22 (23 P. 370, 17 Am.St.Rep. 2:)2)] .) In Bush v. Lindsey,
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t<>stalor dcrisPd his property to iII(' ehil(l of a
son, b:lt tlid not mention (•hildren of tlw testator
lt was held that this di<1 not show that he had
t·en in mind and intended to omit thelll. h1 In re
SIIJim, the testator faih•d to mrutim1 or' pnwide for
ter, but ldt a lrgaey to her ehild, the testator's
; and it 'ras held that the fact that lw mentioned his
's ehild did not nee(•ssm·ily imply that the daughter
his miud, and she ,,·as permitted to take as a preheir." (Emphasis 1H1(led.) In In rr: Stevens,
~;J Cal. ;)22 [23 P. ;)7!1, 17 Am.St.Hcp. 252], the testator
r.o mention or provide for his daughter but left her
the testator's grandson, a legacy. It was held the
,,·as pretermitted, the court stating (p. 329): "[I]t
omission J mnst appear on the face of ihe >Yill,
must then appear from words whieh imlieate sneh
intent directly, or by implication equally as str011g. Any
otlH'r rule wonl(l lead to guesses or to inf(•ren(•es merely
which would be too unsubstantial to base a
on. \V c do not think that we ean sa~' with any
eertainty that the wonls usN1 in the will indicate
1l1ai :\Irs. Hubbard \Yas in the rninil of the testator when
he \HOi e his will, and that he intentionally omitted to mention
her. \Ye think that the corrcet rule is, that the words of the
will must show, as above pointed ont, that the I rstator had the
person omittrcl in his rnin('l, and having her so in his mind,
had omitted to make any mention of her.
"
rule here laid down is plain and simple, and we
think in aee(mlanee with the statute, as interpreted in the
Uarnmd ease, it is an easy matter to put the question beyoml
a (loubt by naming the children or grandchildren in the
·with a nominal legacy, or none at all, from which it will
appear that these persons are in the mind of the
and therefore the omission to leave them anything
must have been intentional." (Emphasis added.) It is
~aid in EstaJe of Eggleston, 129 Cal.App.2d 601, 607 [277
P.2d 469]: "Under the statute [section 90] au heir is intentionally omitted from a will if it appears from the will
that the testator had the omitted prrson in mind, and having
him in his mind, has omitted him from the provisions of the
will. (Estate of Trickett, 197 Cal. 20, 23 [23!1 P. 406];
Estate of Talm.age, 114 Cal.App.2d 6:34,637 [247 P.2d 1:31].)"
(Emphasis added.) In Estate of Labrie, 130 Cal.App.2d
235, 2:17 r218 P.2c1 760], the court said: "Under the statui!~

intent that the;
of the will
17 Cal.
Estate
203-204.)
'' that is, leaving a small amount
who contests the will is not enough,
''anyone,'' is broad and in116 Cal.App.
clusive. The court so held in Estate of
2d
100
P.2d 41], stating: "In the Estate of Price,
supra, 56 Cal.App.2d
the court had occasion to consider
as follows: 'I purposely refrain from leaving
a clause
. . . to any other person or persons, and in the
event that any other person or persons shall either directly
or
contest this my last will and testament I give
to any such person or persons contesting said ·will the sum
of
and no more, hereby declaring that I have only at this
date two surviving children, to wit: my said two sons above
named., rrhere the testatrix left surviving her not only the
two sons mentioned in her will but two grandchildren,
children of a
deceased son of the testatrix. Upon
the hearing of a
filed on behalf of the grandchildren,
the trial court held that they were pretermitted heirs of
the decrased and entitled to their proportionate share of the
estate. The District Court of Appeal, in affirming the decree,
considered all of the authorities cited above and held them
inapplicable by reason of the fact that the language of the
\Vill made mention only of 'persons' contesting the will and
not to heirs. The court, after referring to the Estate of
Lindsay, 176 Cal. 238 [168 P. 113], and observing that our
Supreme Court therein 'discussed and distinguished' the
case of IIargadine v. Pulte, 27 Mo. 423, proceeds as follows
(p.338):
"'In that case (Hargadine v. Pulte) the excluding clause
covered all and every person or persons. Our Supreme
Court said that from these words it was not apparent ''on
the face of the will'' that the testator intended to distinguish
between his living children and his grandchildren.
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the will of Mrs. Price we find
which
this rule. The
are not menand
is contained therein which would indicate
testatrix had them in mind when the will was exThe
other person or perwhich
the

person or persons
gave to
sum of one dollar. Now it is settled law
heir
his interest under this section
is not a contestant and does not contest the
vest absolutely upon the death of the testator
his particular interest is
there is no will.
of
199 Cal. 391, 405 [245 P.
.) '
at page 339 the court continues as follows:
plain terms of the code section calling for a showupon the face of the will that "such omission was inpreclude a holding that a general exclusion of all
not mentioned is sufficient. If such a general exclause were sufficient the next step would be one dewife my sole heir" which was held insufficim1t
wr.ruu.mJ v. Bradley, 24 Mo. 311, and in which
said
320) : "And in
the testator's will in
ease, it is not in the power of the court, from the will
to say whether the testator had a child living or not, or
he ever had one. As to the children of the testator
is a mere
" We could say the same
we were to reverse the case, it would be necessary to
in judicial legislation, and to declare that the secthe code did not require the ''intentional'' omission
heir to appear upon the face of the will.' " Estate
56 Cal.App.2d 335 [132 P.2d 485], is particularly in
There the testator provided in his will that
refrom leaving anything to
other
' and if
other person" contests the will he shall receive $1.00.
held that there was no intentional omission of
of a deceased child.
clause in the instant will says that if any person
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who would be entitled to share in deceased's estate, if he died
intestate, shall contest the will he shall receive $1.00 only.
It is nothing more than a contest clause and the reference
''any person'' no more shows that he had his daughter in
mind than the ''any person'' words in the Price and Cochran
cases, sttpra. .A case very similar to the instant one is In re
Ray's Estate, 69 Nev. 204 [245 P.2d 990], where the testator
had a son born many years before he made his will in which
he provided the same as in the instant case (p. 991 [245
P.2d]) : "If ... any other person who, if I died whollv
or partially intestate, would be entitled to share in my estat~,
shall, in any manner whatsoever, directly or indirectly, contest this \Vill or attack, oppose or in any mann0r seek to
impair or invalidate any provision hereof, or shall, in any
manner whatsoever . . . or shall endeavor to succeed to anv
part of my estate, otherwise than through this Will, then i~
each of the above mentioned cases I hereby bequeath to such
person or persons the sum of One Dollar ($1.00) only . . . . "
The court held this was insufficient to disinherit a son under
a statute the same as ours, stating (p. 992 [245 P.2d]):
"[T]wo questions are presented for our consideration: First:
whether the will through paragraph tenth [above quoted] has
'provided' for Barringer. Second: if not, whether the will
demonstrates that such omission to provide was intentional.
If either question be answered in the affirmative, then Barringer has failed to establish himself as a pretermitted heir.
"Upon these two questions authority is in a state of confusion far from helpful. . . . We cannot escape the conviction that the widespread split of authority is due in some
part to the varying degrees to which the several courts may
feel impelled to question the wisdom of the statutory theory
and presumption of mistake under present day conditions;
or may regard it as an infringement upon freedom of testation to be carefully hedged about with safeguards. . . . In
the absence of apparent testamentary intent it is not within
the judicial province to substitute therefor our own views
as to the proprieties and needs of each individual case and
to modify or exclude application of the statutory presumption accordingly.
''The nature and weight of the presumption created by
our own statute has already been carefully considered by this
eourt in In re Parrott's Estate, 4G Nev. :ns, 330 [203 P.
258, 261]. 'fhere it was held that failure to provide for a
child 'raises the presumption that [the] omission from the

l
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lhe

re Sle/J(i/S, s:l Cal :::w I
17 Am.Rt.
wa::; qnotrd wit!J
as follows: '\Yo think
rule
that !lw words of the will must sh<rw,
tlw IJ':rson om it ted in his
had omitted to make any
Ill

in any '
' conthen, appear that the
the terms of the clause
intended to proyide for him. 'l'he language of
however, shows upon its faee that it HJas not
11:e p1u·poses or
tlu· purpose of makthose of any particular class. It was includ,•d for 1lw purpose• of protecting the will and the estate
attaek. Hs 1!SP of jJw langnage, 'r hereby bequeath
to
person,' does not alter its status in this regard. BepersotJ nndet· lhat paragraph woHld be rntitled
to 1
' there provide-](], he must first (IOmply with
thl' t:OlH1itinn preeedC'nt of attaeking the \rill or the estate.
Snell eolHlitional and nominal 'bequest', inelucled in the will
for ~.neh obvious purpose and \Yithont any intent 011 the part
of lite testaior to provide for any indiviclnal or elass, cannot,
fe<>l, be eonsi<lered any 'provision' whatsoever . . . .
\Vc therefore eonelude that thel'0' has been an omission to
for Barringer ·within the meaning of § 9919, N.C.L.
question is whethrr it appears that snch omisTlw
sion \Yas intentionaL
fin;t r,ontcmls that the language of paragraph
itself show~; an intent to omit to provide for Barringer.
rt is statrd that Barringer is the only prrson to whom
this
eonlcl apply and thrrefore the trstator mnst
hayc had Barringer in mind in so providing.
"
eontention we mnst rrject. Jnst as th£s paragraph
sh IJWs lack
clisposdivc ·in I en f. so 1:t shows lack of intent
to rlisinherit a:ny partic11.lar person m· those of any class. If
lhr; testator hacl anuthing at all in mind here,
was that
SOiiwone---anyone at all-- might assert n'ghts against the w£ll
or
1be estate contra1·y to the provisions of the will;
that the IYill and the estate t'lhould be protected against the
a;;s,'J'tion of any sneh rights. That BarringPr falls within

n

714

VAN STRIEN

v.

JONES

C.2d

the scope of the
thus afforded
we feel,
demonstrate that the testator had him
in mind
more tlwn thai he had in min'd every other person in the
world
whose assertion of
he had
''What we seek to find in the will is not the extent of
exclusion
but rather an indication
intent to disinherit. The so-called exclusion
limited form may be said
to
demonstratE' such an
whether it be
nominal pronsiOn . . or by expressed intent to disinherit. . . . In either
used demonstrates
case it may well be said that the
that the testator had in mind the existence of members of
the designated class. No s1wh 'having in mind' can be ass1wned
the language of para{fraph tenth. That paragraph is
purely a general protective device as consistent with pretermission as with remembrance. The scope of the protection
afforded reflects simply the degree of care used in preparation
of the will, the clear intent being to protect against everyone.
A general exclusion of 'all persons not mentioned' is not
sufficient to show that a specific omission was intentional.
In re Price's Estate, 56 Cal.App.2d 335 [132 P.2d 485]. So
the testator here cannot be said to have had in mind the
existence of members of any particular class against whom
such protection was afforded. Certainly it cannot be said that
the expression of testamentary intent to disinherit (if such
may be found) is strong or plain enough to meet the requirements of In re Parrott's Estate, supra." (Emphasis
added.)
Here the deceased testator did not show in his will that he
had his (',hild (appellant) in mind and intentionally omitted
to provide for her. On the contrary it appears that he had
forgotten her. As indicated in pretermission of a spouse
(Pro b. Code, § 70) : "It being necessary for the testator
to have 'in mind' a 'momentous' occasion such as marriage,
it follo>vs that merely naming or giving a legacy to a person
by name, as was done in the case at bar, with no indication
that she may be a prospective spouse, is not enough to prevent
revocation. That indication must appear on the face of the
will. and extrinsic evidence is not admissible to show the
testator's intention, at least unless there is some ambiguity.
As in the Duke case a legacy to a named person alone, although the named person is later married to the testator,
creates no ambiguity; it is merely 'noncommittal' as were

DERNY 7'. \V!LDER
f46 C.2d 715; 299 P.2d 2571
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hnY' in the Duke case."
P.2d
190 Cal. 14fJ
P.
, was oyerruled
23 Cal.2c1 7fJl [147 P.2cl 1]
Estate
598
P.2cl
wrong
and Cochran cases, supra,

eoncnrrcd.
24,
that

for a
Schaner,
grante<l.
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fC'l'OH DESNY, Appellant, v. BILLY WILDER
et
Respondents.
Judgments-Summary Judgments-Issues Precluding Judgment.-The issue to be determined by the trial court in ruling
motion for summary judgment is whether or not the party
the motion has prPsented an.v fncts whieh
nse
a triahle issue or defense, and not to pass on or determine
true facts in the case.
Id.-Summary Judgments-Opposing Affidavits.-The fncts
in affidavits of the party against whom a motion for
summary judgment is made must he accepted as truC', and
he sufficient such affidavits need not
he composed
of
facts.
[3] !d.-Summary Judgments-Affidavits.-A sum11Jary judgment
proper only if affidavits in support of the moving- party
vmnld he sufficient to sustain a judgmPnt in his fanll', anil his
See Cal.Jur.2d, Judgments, § 38 et seq.
Dig. References: [1] Judgments, § 8a(5);
Judgments,
~Sn!O);
Judgments, §8a(8); [4] Appeal and Error, §868;
1'2-18, 25-27, 29-50, 53, 54, 57] Literary Property;
812; [11] Property, §1; [19] Actions, §19:
Con§ 3; [21-23] Contracts, § 4; [24] Evidence, § 327: [28]
~ 95
[51] Agency, § 194; [52] Judgments, ~ 8a(l1);
Pleading, § 273; [56] Pleading, § 175(1); [58] AppPal and
§ 62.

